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Abstract
We propose a novel scheme for selective distribution of content, encoded as documents, that
preserves the privacy of the users to whom the documents are delivered and is based on an efﬁcient
and novel group key management scheme.
Our document broadcasting approach is based on access control policies specifying which users can
access which documents, or subdocuments. Based on such policies, a broadcast document is segmented
into multiple subdocuments, each encrypted with a different key. In line with modern attribute-based
access control, policies are speciﬁed against identity attributes of users. However our broadcasting
approach is privacy-preserving in that users are granted access to a speciﬁc document, or subdocument,
according to the policies without the need of providing in clear information about their identity attributes
to the document publisher. Under our approach, not only does the document publisher not learn the
values of the identity attributes of users, but it also does not learn which policy conditions are veriﬁed
by which users, thus inferences about the values of identity attributes are prevented. Moreover, our
key management scheme on which the proposed broadcasting approach is based is efﬁcient in that it
does not require to send the decryption keys to the users along with the encrypted document. Users
are able to reconstruct the keys to decrypt the authorized portions of a document based on subscription
information they have received from the document publisher. The scheme also efﬁciently handles new
subscription of users and revocation of subscriptions. Please note that this is an improved and extended
version of our previous report [1].
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet and the Web have enabled tools and systems for quickly disseminating data, by
posting on Web sites or broadcasting, to user communities in a large variety of application
domains and for different purposes. However, because of legal requirements, organizational
policies, or commercial reasons, selective access to data should be enforced in order to protect
data from unauthorized accesses. Modern access control models, like XACML [2], allows one to
specify access control policies that are expressed in terms of conditions concerning the protected
objects against properties of subjects, referred to as identity attributes, characterizing the users
accessing the protected data. Examples of identity attributes include the role that a user has in3
his/her1 organization, the age, and the country of origin. A user thus veriﬁes a given access control
policy, if its identity attributes verify the conditions of the policy. The use of such an approach
is crucial to simplify access control administration and support high-level policies closer to
organizational policies and is in line with current initiatives for digital identity management [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]. An approach to support ﬁne-grained selective attribute-based access control
when posting or broadcasting contents is to encrypt each content portion to which the same
access control policy (or set of policies) applies with the same key, and then distributing this
key to each user, satisfying the policy (or any policy in the set) associated with the content
portion. A user would thus receive all the keys for the content portions the user can access [8],
[9].
A critical issue in such a context is represented by the fact that very often identity attributes
encode privacy-sensitive information and this information has to be protected, even from the
party distributing the contents. Privacy is considered a key requirement in all solutions and
initiatives for digital identity management. It is important to notice that because of the problem
of insider threats, today recognized as a major source of data theft and privacy breaches, identity
attributes should still be strongly protected even if the party distributing the contents and the
content recipients belong to the same organization. To date the problem of disseminating contents
to user groups by enforcing attribute-based access control while at the same time assuring the
privacy of the user identity attributes has not been addressed.
To this extent, it is worth noting that a simplistic approach in which the content publisher
encrypts different portions of a document with different keys, and then directly sends keys to
corresponding users has some major drawbacks with respect to user privacy and key management.
On one hand, user private information, encoded in the user identity attributes, is not protected in
the simplistic approach. On the other hand, such a simplistic key management scheme does not
scale well as the number of users becomes large and when multiple keys need to be distributed
to multiple users. The goal of this paper is to develop an approach which does not have these
shortcomings.
In the paper we develop an attribute-based access control mechanism whereby a user is able
to decrypt the disseminated contents if and only if its identity attributes satisfy the content
1We shall use “it” and “its” to refer to a user and the user’s ownership, respectively, in the rest of the paper.4
provider’s policies, whereas the content provider learns nothing about user’s identity attributes.
The mechanism is ﬁne-grained in that different policies can be associated with different content
portions. A user can derive only the encryption keys associated with the portions the user is
entitled to access. A crucial aspect of such an approach is key management. In order to acheive
this goal, we propose a novel ﬂexible key management scheme and integrate it with techniques for
oblivious transfer of information. The proposed key management scheme satisﬁes the following
requirements [10]:
• Minimal trust requires the key management scheme to place trust on a small number of
entities.
• Key indistinguishability requires that for given public information, any element in the key
space has the same probability of being the real key.
• Key independence requires that a leak of one key does not compromise other keys.
• Forward secrecy requires that a user who left the group should not be able to access any
future keys.
• Backward secrecy requires that a newly joining user should not be able to access any old
keys.
• Collusion resistance requires that colluding users can not obtain keys which they are not
allowed to obtain individually.2
• Bandwidth overhead requires that the rekey of the group should not include a high number
of transmitted messages.
• Computational costs should be acceptable at both the key server and users.
• Storage requirements should be minimal; high storage of keys or relevant data need be
avoided in the key management scheme.
In summary, we propose a new protocol for content dissemination which assures policy-based
access control, preserves users’ privacy and satisﬁes all the above requirements. We formally
analyze the protocol and carry on an extensive experimental evaluation to assess its efﬁciency
and scalability. In the rest of the paper we will use the term documents to refer to contents and
to subdocuments to refer to content portions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related work. Section III
provides an overview of our scheme. Section IV introduces the basic notions on which our
2We assume the adversaries have access to any public information and information that users who left the group hold.5
approach is based. Section V presents our new scheme for document broadcasting, and Section VI
analyzes the our scheme in terms of security and efﬁciency. Section VII presents the result
of our experiments. In Section VIII we further discuss issues such concerning scalability and
optimization of the proposed scheme. Section IX concludes the paper and outlines future research
directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Approaches closely related to our work have been investigated in three different areas: selective
publication and broadcast of documents, attribute-based security, and group key management.
The database and security communities have carried out extensive research concerning tech-
niques for the selective dissemination of documents based on access control policies [8], [9],
[11]. These approaches fall in the following two categories.
1) Encryption of different subdocuments with different keys, which are provided to users at
the registration phase, and broadcasting the encrypted subdocuments to all users [8], [9].
2) Selective multicast of different subdocuments to different user groups [11], where all
subdocuments are encrypted with one symmetric encryption key.
The latter approaches assume that the users are honest and do not try to access the subdoc-
uments to which they do not have access authorization. Therefore, these approaches provide
neither backward nor forward key secrecy. In the former approaches, users are able to decrypt
the subdocuments for which they have the keys. However, such approaches require all [8] or
some [9] keys be distributed in advance during user registration phase. This requirement makes
it difﬁcult to assure forward and backward key secrecy when user groups are dynamic with
frequent join and leave operations. Further, the rekey process is not transparent, thus shifting
the burden of acquiring new keys on existing users when others leave or join. In contrast, our
approach makes rekey transparent to users by not distributing actual keys during the registration
phase.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [12] is another approach for implementing encryption-
based access control to documents. Under such an approach, users are able to decrypt subdocu-
ments if they satisfy certain policies. ABE has two variations: associating encrypted documents
with attributes and user keys with policies [13]; associating user keys with attributes and en-
crypted documents with policies [12]. In either cases the cost of key management is minimized6
by using attributes that can be associated with users. However, these approaches require the
attributes considered in the policies to be sent in clear. Having such clear texts reveals sensitive
information about users during both registration and document distribution phases. In contrast,
our approach preserves user privacy in both phases, in that users are not required to reveal the
values of their identity attributes to the content distributor.
Group Key Management (GKM) is a widely investigated topic in the context of group-oriented
multicast applications [10], [14]. Early work on GKM relied on a key server to share a secret
with users to distribute keys to decrypt documents [15], [16]. Such approaches suffer from the
drawback of sending O(n) rekey information, where n is the number of users, in the event of join
or leave to provide forward and backward secrecy. Hierarchical key management schemes [17],
[18], where the key server hierarchically establishes secure channels with different sub-groups
instead of with individual users, were introduced to reduce this overhead. However, they only
reduce the size of the rekey information to O(logn), and furthermore each user needs to manage
at worst O(logn) hierarchically organized redundant keys. Similar to the spirit of our approach,
there have been efforts to make rekey a one-off process [19], [14]. The secure lock approach [19]
based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) performs a single broadcast to rekey. However,
the proposed approach is inefﬁcient for large n values as it requires performing CRT calculation
involving n congruences each time a new document is sent. The access control polynomial
approach [14] encodes secrets given to users at registration phase in a special polynomial of
order at least n in such a way that users can derive the secret key from this polynomial. The
special polynomials used in this approach represent only a small subset of domain of all the
polynomials of order n, and the security of the approach is neither fully analyzed nor proven.
III. OVERVIEW
Our scheme for selective distribution of documents involves four main entities: the Publisher
(Pub), the users referred to as Subscribers (Subs)3, the Identity Providers (IdPs), and the Identity
Manager (IdMgr). It is based on three main phases (see Figure 1): identity token issuance, identity
token registration, and document dissemination.
3In what follows we use the term Sub; however in practice the steps are carried out by the client software transparently to
the actual end user.7
Fig. 1. Overview of our content dissemination scheme
1) Identity token issuance
IdPs issue certiﬁed identity attributes to Subs. Subs present their identity attributes to the
IdMgr which is a trusted third party that issues identity tokens to Subs. An identity token is
a Sub’s identity in a speciﬁed electronic format in which the involved identity attribute value
is represented by a semantically secure cryptographic commitment.4 Identity tokens are used by
Subs during the registration phase.
Note that the main functionality of the IdMgr is to generate a uniform electronic format for an
identity attribute value, in the form of an “identity token.” We adopt this notion for ease of the
presentation. In general, a Sub can engage into a protocol with the IdPs, and request identity
tokens directly from the IdPs, without needing to use the IdMgr. In this sense, our approach is
suitable for both open and closed environments.
2) Identity token registration
In order to be able to decrypt the documents that will be received from the Pub, Subs have to
register at the Pub. During the registration, each Sub presents its identity tokens and receives
from the Pub a conditional subscription secret (CSS) for each identity attribute name in the
Pub’s access control policy condition matching the Sub’s identity token tag. CSSs are used by
Subs to derive the keys to decrypt the subdocuments for which they satisfy the access control
policy and managed by the proposed GKM scheme. The Pub delivers the CSSs to the Subs
using a privacy-preserving approach based on carrying out OCBE protocols [20] with the Subs.
4A cryptographic commitment allows a user to commit to a value while keeping it hidden and preserving the user’s ability
to reveal the committed value later.8
The OCBE protocols ensure that a Sub can obtain a CSS if and only if the Sub’s committed
identity attribute value (within Sub’s identity token) satisﬁes the matching condition in the Pub’s
access control policy, while the Pub learns nothing about the identity attribute value. Note that
not only the Pub does not learn anything about the actual value of Subs’ identity attributes but
it also does not learn which policy conditions are veriﬁed by which Subs, thus the Pub cannot
infer the values of Subs’ identity attributes. Thus Subs’ privacy is preserved in our scheme.
3) Document Dissemination
The Pub broadcasts selectively encrypted documents to Subs. The broadcast is based on access
control policies that specify which documents or subdocuments Subs are entitled to access.
Such policies specify conditions against Subs’ identity attributes. Documents are divided in
subdocuments based on the access control policies that apply to them. The policies apply to a
subdocument form a policy conﬁguration. For each policy conﬁguration, the Pub generates a
symmetric key K and encrypts all the subdocuments to which the conﬁguration applies with the
same symmetric key. To allow Subs to derive the key K for a given policy conﬁguration using
their CSSs in an efﬁcient and secure manner, a new GKM scheme is developed and adopted in
this paper. Unlike approaches such as hierarchical GKM [17], [18], our scheme does not require
a secure communication channel for updating keys. Section V-C gives a detailed description of
the scheme. With this scheme, our broadcasting system efﬁciently handles new subscriptions
and revocations to provide backward and forward secrecy. The system design also ensures that
access control policies can be ﬂexibly updated and enforced at the Pub without changing any
information stored at Subs.
IV. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review some basic notions and the cryptographic and mathematical tools
which are relevant to the construction of the scheme, to help the reader better understand it.
A. Discrete logarithm problem and computational Difﬁe-Hellman problem
Deﬁnition 1: Let G be a (multiplicatively written) cyclic group of order q and let g be a
generator of G. The map ϕ : Z → G,ϕ(n) = gn is a group homomorphism with kernel Zq. The
problem of computing the inverse map of ϕ is called the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) to
the base of g.9
Deﬁnition 2: For a cyclic group G (written multiplicatively) of order q, with a generator
g ∈ G, the Computational Difﬁe-Hellman problem (CDH) is the following problem: Given ga
and gb for randomly-chosen secret a,b ∈ {0,...,q − 1}, compute gab.
Note that CDH-hard is a stronger condition than DL-hard.
B. Pedersen commitment
First introduced in [21], the Pedersen Commitment scheme is an unconditionally hiding and
computationally binding commitment scheme which is based on the intractability of the discrete
logarithm problem. We describe how it works as follows.
Pedersen Commitment
Setup
A trusted third party T chooses a ﬁnite cyclic group G of large prime order p so that the compu-
tational Difﬁe-Hellman problem is hard in G. Write the group operation in G as multiplication.
T chooses two generators g and h of G such that it is hard to ﬁnd the discrete logarithm of h
with respect to g, i.e., an integer α such that h = gα. Note that T may or may not know the
number α. T publishes (G,p,g,h) as the system’s parameters.
Commit
The domain of committed values is the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp of p elements, which can be implemented
as the set of integers Fp = {0,1,...,p−1}. For a party U to commit a value x ∈ Fp, U chooses
r ∈ Fp at random, and computes the commitment c = gxhr ∈ G.
Open
U shows the values x and r to open a commitment c. The veriﬁer checks whether c = gxhr.
C. OCBE Protocols
The Oblivious Commitment-Based Envelope (OCBE) protocols, proposed by Li and Li [20],
provide the capability of delivering information to qualiﬁed users in an oblivious way. There
are three communications parties involved in OCBE protocols: a receiver R, a sender S, and a
trusted third party T. The OCBE protocols make sure that the receiver R can decrypt a message
sent by S if and only if R’s committed value satisﬁes a condition given by a predicate in S’s
access control policy, while S learns nothing about the committed value. Note that S does not10
even learn whether R is able to correctly decrypt the message or not. The supported predicates
by OCBE are comparison predicates >,≥,<,≤,= and  =.
The OCBE protocols are built with several cryptographic primitives:
1) The Pedersen commitment scheme.
2) A semantically secure symmetric-key encryption algorithm E, for example, AES, with key
length k-bits. Let EKey[M] denote the encrypted message M under the encryption algorithm
E with symmetric encryption key Key.
3) A cryptographic hash function H( ). When we write H(α) for an input α in a certain
set, we adopt the convention that there is a canonical encoding which encodes α as a bit
string, i.e., an element in {0,1}∗, without explicitly specifying the encoding.
Given the notation as above, we summarize the OCBE protocols for = (EQ-OCBE) and ≥
(GE-OCBE) predicates as follows. The OCBE protocols for other predicates can be derived and
described in a similar fashion. The protocols’ descriptions are tailored to ﬁt the presentation of
this paper, and are stated in a slightly different way than in [20].
EQ-OCBE Protocol
Parameter generation
T runs a Pedersen commitment setup protocol to generate system parameters Param =  G,g,h .
T outputs the order of G, p, and P = {EQx0 : x0 ∈ Fp}, where
EQa0 : Fp → {true, false}
is an equality predicate such that EQx0(x) is true if and only if x = x0.
Commitment
T ﬁrst chooses an element x ∈ Fp for R to commit. T then randomly chooses r ∈ Fp, and
computes the Pedersen commitment c = gxhr. T sends x,r,c to R, and sends c to S.
Alternatively, in an ofﬂine version, T digitally signs c and sends x,r,c together with the
signature of c to R. Then the validity of the commitment c can be ensured by verifying T’s
signature. In this way, after S obtains T’s public key for signature veriﬁcation, no further
communication is needed between T and S.
Interaction
• R makes a data request to S.11
• Based on this request, S sends an equality predicate EQx0 ∈ P.
• Upon receiving this predicate, R sends S a Pedersen commitment c = gxhr.
• S picks y ∈ F∗
p at random, computes σ = (cg−x0)y, and sends R a pair  η = hy,C =
EH(σ)[M] , where M is a message containing the requested data.
Open
Upon receiving  η,C  from S, R computes σ′ = ηr, and decrypts C using H(σ′).
The GE-OCBE Protocol can be done in a similar way, but in a bit-by-bit fashion, for attribute
values of at most ℓ bits long, where ℓ is a system parameter which speciﬁes an upper bound for
the bit length of attribute values such that 2ℓ < p/2. The GE-OCBE protocol is more complex
in terms of description and computation compared to EQ-OCBE. It works as follows.
GE-OCBE Protocol
Parameter generation
As in EQ-OCBE, T runs a Pedersen commitment setup protocol to generate system parameters
Param =  G,g,h , and outputs the order of G, p. In addition, T chooses another parameter ℓ,
which speciﬁes an upper bound for the length of attribute values, such that 2ℓ < p/2. T outputs
V = {0,1,...,2ℓ − 1} ⊂ Fp, and P = {GEx0 : x0 ∈ V}, where
GEx0 : V → {true, false}
is a predicate such that GEx0(x) is true if and only if x ≥ x0.
Commitment
As in EQ-OCBE, T chooses an integer x ∈ V for R to commit. T then randomly chooses r ∈ Fp,
and computes the Pedersen commitment c = gxhr. T sends x,r,c to R, and sends c to S.
Similarly, an ofﬂine alternative also works here.
Interaction
• R makes a data request to S.
• Based on the request, S sends to R a predicate GEx0 ∈ P.
• Upon receiving this predicate, R sends to S a Pedersen commitment c = gxhr.
• Let d = (x−x0) (mod p). R picks r1,...,rℓ−1 ∈ Fp, and sets r0 = r−
ℓ−1  
i=1
2iri. If GEx0(x)
is true, let dℓ−1 ...d1d0 be d’s binary representation, with d0 the lowest bit. Otherwise
if GEx0 is false, R randomly chooses dℓ−1,...,d1 ∈ {0,1}, and sets d0 = d −
ℓ−1  
i=1
2idi12
(mod p). R computes ℓ commitments ci = gdihri for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1, and sends all of them
to S.
• S checks that cg−x0 =
ℓ−1  
i=0
(ci)2i. S randomly chooses ℓ bit strings k0,...,kℓ−1, and sets
k = H(k0   ...   kℓ−1). S picks y ∈ F∗
p, and computes η = hy,C = Ek[M], where M is
the message containing requested data. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1 and j = 0,1, S computes
σ
j
i = (cig−j)y,C
j
i = H(σ
j
i) ⊕ ki. S sends to R the tuple
 η,C
0
0,C
1
0,...,C
0
ℓ−1,C
1
ℓ−1,C .
Open
After R receives the tuple  η,C0
0,C1
0,...,C0
ℓ−1,C1
ℓ−1,C  from S as above, R computes σ′
i = ηri,
and k′
i = H(σ′
i)⊕C
di
i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ−1. R then computes k′ = H(k′
0   ...   k′
ℓ−1), and decrypts
C using key k′.
The OCBE protocol for the ≤ predicates (LE-OCBE) can be constructed in a similar way
as GE-OCBE. Other OCBE protocols (for  =,<,> predicates) can be built on EQ-OCBE, GE-
OCBE and LE-OCBE.
All these OCBE protocols guarantee that the receiver R can decrypt the message sent by S
if and only if the corresponding predicate is evaluated as true at R’s committed value, and that
S does not learn anything about this committed value.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we describe in detail our data dissemination approach. We ﬁrst introduce the
phase of identity tokens issuance to Subs, followed by the phase in which the Pub generates
and provides Subs proper subscription secrets. We then describe our group key management
scheme. This section also includes an illustrative example.
A. Identity Token Issuance
The IdMgr runs a Pedersen commitment setup algorithm to generate system parameters
Param =  G,g,h . The IdMgr publishes Param as well as the order p of the ﬁnite group
G. The IdMgr also publishes its public key for the digital signature algorithm it is using. Such
parameters are used by the IdMgr to issue identity tokens to Subs. We assume the Subs hold13
identity attributes issued by one or more IdPs and present to the IdMgr such identity attributes
to receive identity tokens as follows. For each identity attribute shown by a Sub, the IdMgr
veriﬁes its validity,5 encodes the identity attribute value as x ∈ Fp in a standard way, and issues
the Sub an identity token. An identity token is a tuple
IT = (nym,id-tag,c,σ),
where nym is a pseudonym for uniquely identifying the Sub in the system, id-tag is the tag
of the identity attribute under consideration, c = gxhr is a Pedersen commitment for the value
x, and σ is the IdMgr’s digital signature for nym,id-tag and c. The IdMgr passes values x and
r to the Sub for the Sub’s private use. We require that all identity tokens of the same Sub
have the same nym,6 so that the Sub and its identity tokens can be uniquely matched with a
nym. Once the identity tokens are issued, they are used by Subs for proving the satisﬁability
of the Pub’s access control policies; Subs keep their identity attribute values hidden, and never
disclose them in clear during the interactions with other parties.
Example 1: Suppose a Sub Bob presents his driver’s license to IdMgr to receive an identity
token for his age. IdMgr assigns Bob a pseudonym pn-1492. IdMgr deduces from the birthdate
on Bob’s driver’s license that Bob’s age is x = 28. The IdMgr randomly chooses a value
r = 9270, and computes a Pedersen commitment c = gxhr. The IdMgr then digitally signs the
message containing Bob’s pseudonym, a tag for “age” and the commitment c. The identity token
Bob receives from the IdMgr may look like this:
IT = (pn-1492,age,6267292101,949148425702313975).
B. Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Conditional Subscription Secret Delivery
We assume that the Pub deﬁnes a set of access control policies denoted as ACPB that speciﬁes
which subdocuments Subs are authorized to access. Access control policies are formally deﬁned
as follows.
5The IdMgr can verify the validity of Sub’s identity either in a traditional way, e.g., through a on-the-spot registration, or
digitally over computer networks. We will not dive into the details of identity validity check in this paper.
6In practice, this can be achieved by requesting the Sub to present a strong identiﬁer that correlates with the identity being
registered. Again, we will not discuss this process in this paper.14
Deﬁnition 3: (Attribute Condition).
An attribute condition cond is an expression of the form: “nameA op l”, where nameA is the
name of an identity attribute A, op is a comparison operator such as =, <, >, ≤, ≥,  =, and l
is a value that can be assumed by attribute A.
Deﬁnition 4: (Access control policy).
An access control policy acp is a tuple (s,o,D) where: o denotes a set of portions (subdoc-
uments) {D1,...,Dt} of document D; and s is a conjunction of attribute conditions cond1 ∧
... ∧ condn that must be satisﬁed by a Sub to have access to o. 7
Example 2: The access control policy
(“level ≥ 58
′′ ∧ “role = nurse
′′,
{physical exam,treatment plan},“EHR.xml”)
states that a Sub of level no lower than 58 and holding a nurse position has access to the
subdocuments “physical exam” and “treatment plan” of document EHR.xml.
Different access control policies can apply to the same subdocuments because such subdoc-
uments may have to be accessed by different categories of Subs. We denote the set of access
control policies that apply to a subdocument as policy conﬁguration.
Deﬁnition 5: (Policy conﬁguration).
A policy conﬁguration Pc for a subdocument D1 of a document D is a set of policies {acp1,...,acpk}
where acpi,i = 1,...,k is an access control policy (s,o,D) such that D1 ∈ o.
There can be multiple subdocuments in D which have the same policy conﬁguration. For each
policy conﬁguration of D, the Pub generates a key K for a symmetric key encryption algorithm
(e.g, AES), and uses K to encrypt all subdocuments associated with this policy conﬁguration.
Therefore, if a Sub satisﬁes access control policies acp1,...,acpm, Pub must make sure that
the Sub can derive all the symmetric keys to decrypt those subdocuments to which a policy
conﬁguration containing at least one access control policies acpi(i = 1,...,m) applies.
As in our scheme the actual symmetric keys are not delivered along with the encrypted
documents, a Sub has to register its identity tokens at the Pub in order to derive the symmetric
encryption key from the disseminated data. During the registration, a Sub receives a set of
7In what follow we use the dot notation to denote the different components of an access control policy.15
conditional subscription secrets (CSSs), based on the identity attribute names corresponding to
the attribute names in the identity tokens. Note that CSSs are generated by the Pub only based
on the names of identity attributes and not on their values. So a Sub may receive an encrypted
CSS corresponding to a condition which has a value that the Sub’ identity attribute does not
satisfy. However, in this case, the Sub will not be able to extract the CSS from the message
delivering it. Proper CSSs are later used by a Sub to compute symmetric decryption keys for
particular subdocuments of broadcast encrypted documents, as discussed in Section V-C. The
delivery of CSSs are performed in such a way that the Sub can correctly receive an CSS if
and only if the Sub has an identity token whose committed identity attribute value satisﬁes an
attribute condition in Pub’s access control policy, while the Pub does not learn any information
about the Sub’s identity attribute value and does not learn whether Sub has been able to obtain
the CSS.
To enable Subs registration, the Pub ﬁrst chooses an ℓ′-bit prime number q, a cryptographic
hash function H( ) whose output bit length is no shorter than ℓ′, and a semantically secure
symmetric-key encryption algorithm with key length ℓ′ bits. The Pub publishes these parameters.
Then for an access control policy acp in ACPB that a subscriber Subi under pseudonym nymi
wants to satisfy, it selects and registers an identity token IT = (nymi,id-tag,c,σ) with respect
to each attribute condition condj in acp. Note that Subi does not register only for the attribute
condition which the Subi’s identity token satisﬁes; to assure privacy, Subi registers its identity
token for any attribute condition whose identity attribute name matches the id-tag contained in
the identity token. In this way, the Pub cannot infer from Subi’s registration which condition
Subi is actually interested in.
The Pub checks if id-tag matches the name of the identity attribute in condj, and veriﬁes
the IdMgr’s signature σ using the IdMgr’s public key. If either of the above steps fails, the Pub
aborts the interaction. Otherwise, the Pub generates a κ-bit random value ri,j ∈ Fq, where κ
is a security parameter chosen by the Pub. ri,j is the conditional subscription secret. The Pub
then starts an OCBE session as a sender (S) to obliviously transfer ri,j to Subi who acts as a
receiver (R). The Pub maintains a table T storing all the delivered ri,j along with the associated
Sub’s pseudonym nymi and policy condition condj. Upon the completion of the OCBE session
the Pub performs the following actions:
• If nymi does not exist in the table, it ﬁrst creates a row for it.16
• It saves ri,j as a record in T with respect to nymi and condj. An old CSS is overridden
by the new CSS ri,j if it already exists. This will allow a Sub to update the Pub with its
updated identity tokens.
We remark that all CSSs are independent, so the above CSS delivery process can be executed in
parallel. Table T is used by the Pub to create public information for access control of broadcast
documents, and should be protected.
Example 3: Table I shows an example of table T . A Sub under pseudonym pn-0012 who has
an identity token with respect to identity tag role registers for all attribute conditions (“role =
doc” and “role = nur” are shown in Table I) involving identity attribute role. This Sub does
not register for attribute conditions “level ≥ 59”, “YoS ≥ 5” 8 and “YoS < 5”, either because it
does not hold an identity token with identity tag level or YoS, thus cannot register, or because
it chooses not to register as it only needs to access subdocuments whose associated access
control policy does not require conditions for these attributes. A drawback of registering only
for the conditions required is that it may allow an attacker to infer certain attributes about the
Sub with high conﬁdence. To protect against such attacks the Sub may choose to register for
all conditions. Note that the Sub under pn-0829 registers for both conditions YoS ≥ 5 and
YoS < 5, which are mutually exclusive and thus cannot both be satisﬁed by any Sub. The
registration for both conditions is crucial for privacy in that it prevents the Pub from inferring
from the Sub’s registration behavior which condition the Sub is actually interested in. A Sub
under pn-1492 registers for all ﬁve attribute conditions.
TABLE I
A TABLE OF CSSS MAINTAINED BY THE PUB
nym level ≥ 59 YoS ≥ 5 YoS < 5 role = doc role = nur ...
pn-0012 — — — 86571 96875 ...
pn-0829 47785 56456 87534 — — ...
pn-1492 11109 4578 10491 13011 60987 ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
8YoS means “years of service”.17
C. Group Key Management Scheme
A trivial approach to key management is to deliver all needed keys to qualiﬁed Subs. However,
this approach suffers from various shortcomings. First, it is a Sub-to-Sub process, as the Pub
must delivery the keys to each Sub individually. Second, key maintenance is expensive: a Sub
may have to keep track of a high number of keys; whenever an encryption key is changed, every
involved Sub needs to be notiﬁed and provided with the new keys.
In this section, we propose a new group key management scheme which enables any registered
Sub whose identity attributes satisfy at least one of the access control policies applicable
to a subdocument to compute the encryption/decryption key, thus to view the content of the
subdocument.
1) Basic construction: The Pub generates policy conﬁgurations for all subdocuments of D.
For each policy conﬁguration, the Pub identiﬁes all the subdocuments to which the policy
conﬁguration applies, each of which will then be encrypted with the same symmetric encryption
key. Without loss of generality, we will focus on one subdocument, referred to as D1, when
introducing the scheme.
Let D1’s associated policy conﬁguration be Pc = {acp1,...,acpα}, where each acpk is a
conjunction of conditions cond
(k)
1 ∧ ... ∧ cond
(k)
mk.
For each acpk, the Pub searches the database table T to get a list of pseudonyms Uk =
{nym
(k)
1 ,...,nym(k)
nk } whose CSS records corresponding to the attribute conditions in acpk are
in T . The Pub chooses a suitable value
N ≥
α  
k=1
#Uk, (1)
where #Uk denotes the cardinality of the set Uk.
Let r
(k)
i,j ∈ Fq be the CSS of a subscriber with nym
(k)
i for cond
(k)
j .
For Pc (or equivalently, D1), the Pub chooses an encryption key K randomly from F×
q , and
N random τ-bit values z1,...,zN, where τ is chosen such that τ   N is larger than 160. This
choice of the parameter will ensure the zi sequence from different sessions will be different with18
high probability, and with the effect of “birthday paradox” being considered.9 Pub lets
A =

      
                  

1 a
(1)
1,1 a
(1)
1,2 ... a
(1)
1,N
1 a
(1)
2,1 a
(1)
2,2 ... a
(1)
2,N
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
1 a
(1)
n1,1 a
(1)
n1,2 ... a
(1)
n1,N
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
1 a
(α)
1,1 a
(α)
1,2 ... a
(α)
1,N
1 a
(n′)
2,1 a
(n′)
2,2 ... a
(n′)
2,N
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
1 a
(α)
nα,1 a
(α)
nα,2 ... a
(α)
nα,N

      
                  

,
where
a
(k)
i,j = H(r
(k)
i,1 ||r
(k)
i,2 ||...||r
(k)
i,mk||zj), (2)
where || is the string concatenation operation. The Pub solves for a nonzero (N+1)-dimensional
column vector Y such that AY = 0. Note that such a nontrivial Y always exists, because the
number of rows of matrix A is less than or equal to N by (1), thus the null space of A is
guaranteed nontrivial. We call such a vector Y an access control vector (ACV).
Document Broadcasting:
The Pub sets the vector
X = (K,0,0,...,0)
T + Y,
where vT is the transpose of vector v and K is the encryption key for D1. The Pub broadcasts
the subdocument D1 encrypted with K together with the values X, z1,...,zN, as part of the
entire document D.
Decryption Key Derivation:
If a Sub with nymi wants to view the subdocument D1, it picks an access control policy acpk
it satisﬁes, and computes
K
′ = (1,a
(k)
i,1,a
(k)
i,2,...,a
(k)
i,N)   X,
9A more detailed analysis on the choice of parameters will be made in a later version of the paper.19
where ak
i,j are computed as in (2). We call any (N + 1)-dimensional vector ν whose ﬁrst entry
is 1 such that νY = 0 a key extraction vector (KEV) with respect to K and X.
New Subscription:
When a new subscriber Sub
′ registers at the Pub, the Pub delivers corresponding CSSs to Sub
′,
and updates the table T . The Pub then performs a rekey process for all involved subdocuments
(or equivalently, policy conﬁgurations). When Pub broadcasts new documents, it also publishes
the updated X and zi.
Credential Revocation
The conditions under which a Sub needs to be revoked is out of the scope of this paper. We
assume that the Pub will be notiﬁed when a Sub with a pseudonym nymi is revoked from those
who may satisfy condj. In this case, the Pub simply removes the value ri,j from table T , and
performs a rekey process for all involved subdocuments. Allowing particular CSSs to be deleted
from T enables a ﬁne-tuned user management.
Credential Update
A Sub’s credentials may have to be updated over time for various reasons such as promotions,
change of responsibilities, etc. In this case, the Sub with a pseudonym nymi submits updated
credential condj to Pub. Pub simply replace the existing ri,j in the table T , and performs a
rekey process only for the subdocuments involved.
Subscription Revocation
When a Sub with a pseudonym nymi needs to be removed, the Pub removes the row corre-
sponding to nymi from the table T , and performs a rekey process only for the subdocuments
involved.
Note that in all cases of new subscription, credential revocation, credential update and sub-
scription revocation, the rekey process does not introduce any cost to Subs in that except
for those whose identity attributes are added, updated or revoked, no Sub needs to directly
communicate with the Pub to update CSSs–new encryption/decryption keys can be derived by
using the original CSSs and updated public values published by the Pub. The ability to derive
the secret encryption/decryption keys using public values is a key point to achieve transparency
in subscription handling. Most of the existing GKM schme fails to achieve this objective.
2) An example: We now illustrate how our group key management scheme works through a
simpliﬁed example in a healthcare scenario. This discussion is based on the information available20
at [22].
Example 4: A hospital’s data center Pub has to broadcast an XML ﬁle “EHR.xml” which
contains the electronic health record (EHR) of a patient to the hospital’s employees.
– EHR.xml –
<PatientRecord>
<ContactInfo>
... ...
</ContactInfo>
<BillingInfo>
... ...
</BillingInfo>
<ClinicalRecord>
<HistoryOfPresentIllness>
... ...
</HistoryOfPresentIllness>
<PastMedicalHistory>
... ...
</PastMedicalHistory>
<Medication>
// This has the current prescription
... ...
<Medication>
<AlergiesAndAdverseReactions>
... ...
</AlergiesAndAdverseReactions>
<FamilyHistory>
... ...
</FamilyHistory>
<SocialHistory>
// Things like smoking, drinking, etc.
... ...21
<SocialHistory>
<PhysicalExams>
// Weight, body temperature, skin tests, etc.
... ...
</PhysicalExams>
<LabRecords>
// X-rays, etc.
... ...
</LabRecords>
<Plan>
// What needs to be done, etc.
... ...
</Plan>
</ClinicalRecord>
</PatientRecord>
The subdocuments of “EHR.xml”, marked with different XML tags, need to be accessed by
different employees based on their roles and other identity attributes. Suppose the roles for the
hospital’s employees are: receptionist (rec), cashier (cas), doctor (doc), nurse (nur), data analyst
(dat), and pharmacist (pha). The involved access control policies for “EHR.xml” are
1) acp1 = (“role = rec′′,{ ContactInfo },“EHR.xml”)
2) acp2 = (“role = cas′′,{ BillingInfo },“EHR.xml”)
3) acp3 = (“role = doc
′′,{ ClinicalRecord },“EHR.xml”)
4) acp4 = (“role = nur ∧ level ≥ 59′′,{ ContactInfo , Medication , PhysicalExams ,
 LabRecords , Plan },“EHR.xml”)
5) acp5 = (“role = dat
′′,{ ContactInfo , LabRecords },“EHR.xml”)
6) acp6 = (“role = pha
′′,{ BillingInfo , Medication },“EHR.xml”)
“EHR.xml” is divided into subdocuments based on these access control policies:
-  ContactInfo : acp1, acp4, acp5
-  BillingInfo : acp2, acp6
-  Medication : acp3, acp4, acp622
-  PhysicalExams : acp3, acp4
-  LabReports : acp3, acp4, acp5
-  Plan : acp3, acp4
- Other stuff: none
The policy conﬁgurations and their associated subdocuments are:
Pc1 = {acp1,acp4,acp5} ↔  ContactInfo 
Pc2 = {acp2,acp6} ↔  BillingInfo 
Pc3 = {acp3,acp4,acp6} ↔  Medication 
Pc4 = {acp3,acp4} ↔  PhysicalExams , Plan 
Pc5 = {acp3,acp4,acp5} ↔  LabReports 
Pc6 = {} ↔ Other XML tags
Assume that involved hospital employees have already obtained their identity tokens and have
received their CSSs through the delivery phase described in Section V-B, and that the CSS table
T has been created by Pub. Pub chooses an encryption key Ki for each policy conﬁguration
Pci to encrypt the associated subdocuments.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case of Pc4 = {acp3,acp4} and use the visible
records in Table I for demonstration. An SQL-styled database query
SELECT * FROM T WHERE ‘role = doc
′ <> NULL
returns two rows containing pseudonyms pn-0012 and pn-1492, corresponding to the employees
which can potentially access subdocuments to which acp3 applies. Similarly, it can be easily
seen that an employee under pn-1492 is the only one who may satisfy acp4. The Pub then
chooses N = 3, and random values z1,z2,z3. For the employee under pn-0012 whose CSS for
the attribute condition ““role = doc” is 86571, the Pub computes values
a1,1 = H(86571||z1),a1,2 = H(86571||z2),a1,3 = H(86571||z3).
The Pub executes a similar computation for the user under pn-1492 thus obtaining the values
a2,1 = H(13011||z1),a2,2 = H(13011||z2),a2,3 = H(13011||z3).
By now the Pub has computed both required rows of matrix A for acp3, and will process acp4.
In this case, for pn-1492 whose CSSs corresponding to the two conditions “role = nur” and
“level ≥ 59” are r3,1 and r3,2, respectively, the Pub computes23
a3,1 = H(11109||60987||z1),a3,2 = H(11109||60987||z2),
a3,3 = H(11109||60987||z3).
For simplicity and illustration purpose, assume q = 17, and the resulting matrix over F17
A =

  

1 15 3 4
1 4 13 3
1 12 5 6

  

.
The Pub solves AY = 0 to for a non-trivial Y = (4,4,3,3)T. Let K4 = 11. The Pub sets
X = Y + (K4,0,0,0)
T = (15,4,3,3)
T.
The Pub publishes X, z1,z2,z3 with the associated subdocuments  PhysicalExams , Plan ,
which are encrypted with a symmetric encryption key K4 = 11.
Suppose that the employee under pn-0012 is a doctor, thus satisﬁes acp3 and has correctly
received the CSS during the delivery process. To obtain the decryption key K4, the doctor
computes a1,1 = 15, a1,2 = 3 and a1,3 = 4 as the Pub did, then calculates
K4 = (1,a1,1,a1,2,a1,3)   X = (1,15,3,4)   (15,4,3,3)
T = 11.
The doctor can now use this key to decrypt the subdocuments  PhysicalExams , Plan .
Suppose that the employee under pn-1492 is a nurse of level 58. Then it satisﬁes neither
acp3 nor acp4; therefore it cannot receive the CSSs 11109 or 13001. Although this nurse has
the correct CSS 60987 for attribute condition “role = nur”, it is not able to compute any of a2,i
or a3,i, i = 1,2,3, and thus is not able to obtain a KEV to derive the decryption key K4. Hence
it cannot access the subdocuments  PhysicalExams , Plan .
The process is similar for the other policy conﬁgurations. It is worth remarking, though, that
for the policy conﬁguration Pc6, which is an empty set, the Pub can just encrypt the associated
subdocuments with an encryption key K6 without the need of publishing X or zi, because in
this case no employee is authorized to access this portion of data.
VI. ANALYSIS
In this section we ﬁrst analyze the security of our techniques. We then discuss relevant
performance issues of our techniques.24
A. CSS Delivery Security
Two security requirements need be satisﬁed in the delivery phase of the CSS values ri,j for
Subi and condj:
1) Access control. The CSS value ri,j can be correctly delivered to the user Subi if and only
if Subi has an identity token whose committed identity attribute value satisﬁes condj.
2) User privacy. The Pub learns nothing about the value of the Sub’s identity attribute.
The use of OCBE protocols guarantees that both requirements are satisﬁed. In order to prevent
the Pub from inferring any additional information about a Sub’s identity attribute value, for
such an attribute, the Sub may and shall choose to register its identity token for all conditions
involving this attribute. For example, a Sub who holds an identity token whose tag is role and
committed value is “nurse” registers the identity token for all attribute conditions associated
with role, so that the Pub will not know which condition the Sub is actually interested in, thus
successfully guess its real role. Note that the Sub in order to request any CSS corresponding to
an attribute condition involving a given attribute, must have an identity token with a tag equal
to the name of this attribute. An extension of our approach allows the Sub to further hide the
attributes it is interested in, even though the Sub may not have proofs of these identities from the
IdP, by obtaining from the IdMgr identity tokens for such attributes whose committed values,
set by the IdMgr, lie out of the “normal” range of values.
B. Group Key Management Scheme Analysis
In this section, we focus on the security of our newly proposed group key management scheme.
In our analysis, we will model a cryptographic hash function as a random oracle,10 and base the
discussion on requirements listed in Section I.
The security analysis is based on the following lemma, whose proof is straightforward.
Lemma 1: Let F = Fq be a ﬁnite ﬁeld with q elements. Let V be an n-dimensional F-vector
space. Let v1,...,vm be m independently uniformly randomly chosen vectors in V , where
10Intuitively, a random oracle is a mathematical function that maps every query to a uniformly randomly chosen response
from its output domain.25
m ≤ n. Then the probability that v1,...,vm are linearly independent is
m  
i=1
 
1 − 1/q
n−i+1 
. (3)
1) Soundness of the scheme: We say the group key management scheme is sound if a qualiﬁed
Sub can always correctly derive the decryption key.
Let K be an encryption key for a subdocument, and X be the vector published with the
encrypted document. The ACV is Y = X − (K,0,...,0)T. Recall that for any KEV ν with
respect to K and X, we always have νY = 0. By deﬁnition ν has 1 as its ﬁrst entry, so it is
clear that νX = K.
The soundness of the proposed key management scheme follows from the fact that each valid
Sub can compute a row of the matrix A which is a KEV with respect to K and X, then use
this KEV to extract the encryption key.
2) Security: Minimal trust. The Pub is the only entity in the key management scheme which
is responsible for generating and distributing the encryption/decryption keys.
Key indistinguishability and key independence. Given the public vector X, any element K ∈
Fq has the same probability of being the designated encryption key for a policy conﬁguration.
Indeed, for this K, let ν = (1,a1,...,aN) be an (N + 1)-dimensional row vector such that
νY = 0, where Y = X −(K,0,...,0)T, then we have νX = K.11 With the hash function H( )
modeled as a random oracle, it follows that it is not possible to distinguish the real encryption key
from any value in the key space Fq by having only knowledge of the public values X,z1,...,zN.
The independence of the encryption keys corresponding to different policy conﬁgurations and
sessions is a direct consequence.
Forward secrecy. When a Sub is no longer allowed to access the subdocument corresponding
to a policy conﬁguration, a rekey takes place.12 A new encryption key K′ is chosen and a new
set of values X,z1,...,zN is published by the Pub. With the hash function H( ) being modeled
as a random oracle, the updated vectors that correspond to the Subs’ key extraction vectors
from the previous session can be viewed as chosen independently uniformly at random. Since
11Such a ν with 1 as its ﬁrst entry can almost always be found. The only exception happens when X has its ﬁrst entry
followed all 0s. An X of this form can easily be identiﬁed by the Pub and excluded from consideration.
12Forward secrecy is relevant in our context when documents are updated and the policies associated with the updated
documents change. We discuss it for completeness.26
the total number of Subs is no more than N, by Lemma 1, we conclude that all these updated
vectors are linearly independent with a probability greater than or equal to
N  
i=1
 
1 − 1/q
N−i+1 
≥
∞  
i=1
 
1 − 1/q
i 
≈ 1, 13
when q is large. Therefore, by construction all key extraction vectors ν such that νX = K′ spans
an N-dimensional Fq-subspace W. The updated vector   ν for Sub is an (N + 1)-dimensional
row vector with 1 as its ﬁrst entry. It can be easily shown that the probability that   ν is in W is
1/q. When q is large, the probability is negligible. Therefore in practice any revoked Sub cannot
correctly compute the updated encryption keys by following the key derivation procedure.
Backward secrecy. Similar to the discussion of forward secrecy, it can be easily seen that a
newly joined Sub can retrieve an earlier encryption key only with a negligible probability.
Collusion resistance. With H( ) modeled as a random oracle, external or revoked adversaries
have only knowledge of independent random vectors. Colluding adversaries do not have advan-
tages compared to an individual attacker who tries to use these independent information pieces.
When q is large, the probability that the decryption key can be retrieved by colluding adversaries
who follow the key extraction procedure is negligible.
3) Other requirements: Bandwidth overhead. Once a Sub’s CSSs are delivered via the de-
livery phase, they are stable for the Sub and no further direct communication is required between
Pub and Sub. Each time the dynamics of the set of subscribers or documents changes (e.g.,
encryption key update, a Sub joining or leaving the set of subscribers), the values X,z1,...,zN
are broadcast with the encrypted documents. Such a broadcast has O(ℓ′N)-bit bandwidth over-
head, where ℓ′ is the bit length of the size of the underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, for transmitting these
values. As we will see in Section VII, this is not a problem in practice.
Computational costs. A Sub only needs to conduct N + 1 hashing operations, compute an
inner product of two (N +1)-dimensional Fq-vectors to extract the encryption key, and perform
a symmetric-key decryption for a document. As shown by the experiments in Section VII, this
computation is light-weight.
13The formula on the left hand side is forumula (3) with n = N and m = n. This is because all vectors under consideration
have 1 as the value of their ﬁrst entries. If we ignore all their ﬁrst entries, we are left with N-dimensional q-vectors. A necessary
condition for all these N-dimensional vectors to be linearly independent is that all original (N + 1)-dimensional vectors are
linearly independent.27
However, each time when a new encryption key and an access control vector need be gen-
erated, the Pub has to solve a linear system of size N, over a large ﬁnite ﬁeld which can be
computationally costly as N becomes large. Experiments in Section VII evaluate the performance
of the scheme in terms of the size of the matrix A.
Storage requirements. Nowadays we are less worried about the storage requirements on both
the Pub and the Subs’ sides in general. Users as mobile clients may have special space limitation
to consider. However, a Sub only needs O(ℓ′N) bits to store the needed information (e.g., the
CSSs, the KEV, information about the ﬁnite ﬁelds) when deriving a decryption key. The space
requirement can be easily satisﬁed for a reasonable number of Subs and a ﬁnite ﬁeld of suitable
size.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present experimental results for various parameters in our system. We have
built a fully functioning system in C/C++ that incorporates our techniques for privacy preserving
CSS delivery based on the OCBE protocols, and efﬁcient key management.
The experiments were performed on a machine running GNU/Linux kernel version 2.6.27 with
an Intel R   CoreTM 2 Duo CPU T9300 2.50GHz and 4 Gbytes memory. Only one processor was
used for computation. The code is built with 64-bit gcc version 4.3.2, optimization ﬂag -O2.
The code is built over the G2HEC C++ library [23], which implements the arithmetic operations
in the Jacobian groups of genus 2 curves. For the CSS delivery and group key management
phases, we use V. Shoup’s NTL library [24] version 5.4.2 for ﬁnite ﬁeld arithmetic, and SHA-1
implementation of OpenSSL [25] version 0.9.8 for cryptographic hashing.
A. CSS Delivery
The CSS delivery phase uses the OCBE protocols, which consist of three major steps: 1)
extra commitments generation (OCBE for inequality conditions only) at the Sub, 2) envelope
composition at the Pub, and 3) envelope opening at the Sub.14 In this section, we evaluate the
performance of these three steps for both EQ- and GE-OCBE protocols.
14Interested readers may refer to [20], [7] for details.28
We choose the group G to be the rational points of the Jacobian variety (aka. Jacobian group)
of a genus 2 curve
C : y2 = x5 + 2682810822839355644900736x3
+226591355295993102902116x2 + 2547674715952929717899918x
+4797309959708489673059350
over the prime ﬁeld Fq, with q = 5 1024 +8503491 (83 bits). The Jacobian group of this curve
has a prime order
p =24999999999994130438600999402209463966197516075699 (164 bits).15
The OCBE parameter generation program chooses non-unit points g and h in the Jacobian
group as the base points for constructing the Pedersen commitments.
We use attribute values that satisfy the attribute conditions in the policy. We expect a similar
running time if the attribute values do not satisfy the attribute conditions in the policy. For
GE-OCBE, we vary the value of the ℓ parameter, which controls the range of the difference
between the committed value x and the value x0 speciﬁed in the policy, from 5 to 40, and
performed evaluation accordingly. In this experiment, we run both EQ- and GE-OCBE protocols
for randomly chosen data, for 50 rounds, and take the average values. Figure 2 and Table II
report the average running time of one round of the GE-OCBE protocol and the EQ-OCBE
protocol, respectively.
The experimental results show that the overall computation takes at most a few seconds for the
privacy preserving subscription through the OCBE protocols when all possible identity attribute
values lie within an interval of width up to 240. Because of the impact of the values of ℓ on
the performance of the CSS delivery, it is important to choose ℓ as small as possible, while
at the same time large enough to upper-bound the attribute values. For example, the identity
attribute “age” (in years) usually has values from 0 to 200 and can be represented using 8 bits.
In this case, it is sufﬁcient to choose ℓ to be 8. We expect other OCBE protocols for inequality
predicates to have a performance similar to that of GE-OCBE, because the design and operations
are similar.
15The data is taken from [26].29
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Fig. 2. Average computation time for running one round of GE-OCBE protocol
TABLE II
AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIME FOR RUNNING ONE ROUND OF THE EQ-OCBE PROTOCOL
Computation Time (in ms)
Create Extra Commitments (Sub) 0.00
Open Envelope (Sub) 35.25
Compose Envelope (Pub) 11.80
B. Group Key Management
In this section we perform experiments to evaluate the performance of generation of the ACVs
at the Pub and the key derivation from the ACVs at the Sub, and the size of the ACVs for
different system parameters including the number of maximum users and the number of attribute
conditions. All ﬁnite ﬁeld arithmetic operations are performed in an 80-bit prime ﬁeld.
The following experiments are performed with different user conﬁgurations. A user conﬁg-
uration indicates the number of current Subs and the maximum user limit N. For example,
the conﬁguration ‘25% Subs’ with N = 1000, has 250 Subs. We use 25 policies, each on
average containing two conditions. Each Sub satisﬁes the policy in the policy conﬁguration
under consideration. We illustrate the experiments for one subdocument, as computations related30
to different subdocuments are independent and similar, and thus can be performed in parallel.
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Fig. 3. Time to generate an ACV for different user conﬁgurations
Figure 3 reports the average time spent in computing an ACV corresponding to the matrix A
for different user conﬁgurations. An ACV is a random vector in the null space of matrix A. We
generate an ACV by ﬁrst computing a basis of the null space of A, then choosing the ACV as
a random linear combination of the basis vectors. For a given N, the ACV computation time
increases with the number of current users. This is consistent with the fact that as the number
of current users increases, the number of rows in the matrix A (consequently the rank of A)
increases, requiring an increasing amount of elementary matrix operations to compute the null
space for the linear solver of NTL. As shown in Figure 3, this computation is efﬁcient (less than
45 seconds on a personal computer) for reasonably large N values.
Figure 4 reports the average time for Subs to derive the symmetric keys from ACVs and KEVs
for different user conﬁgurations. Key derivation is performed by Subs whose computational
capabilities may be limited. Therefore, an efﬁcient decryption key derivation process is desired.
As Figure 4 shows it not only incurs minimal computational costs (a few milliseconds), but also
increases only linearly with N.
Figure 5 shows the average size of ACVs for different user conﬁgurations. Another design
goal of our approach is to keep the additional communication overhead minimum. In order to31
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achieve this goal, the Pub compresses the ACVs before broadcasting them with the encrypted
documents. As Figure 5 indicates, our approach only requires a few kilobytes to transmit these
vectors, and the size increases only linearly with N.
In the following experiment, we measure the time for ACV generation (at Pub) and key
derivation (at Sub) by varying the average number of attribute conditions per policy, and keeping
the number of policies and the maximum number of users ﬁxed at 25 and 500, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the average running time for ACVs generation at Pub and symmetric de-
cryption key derivation at Sub, for different number of conditions per policy. As the number of
conditions per policy increases, the key derivation time remains almost constant but the ACV
generation time slightly increases (by less than 100 milliseconds).
VIII. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we further discuss some relevant features of our scheme and also compare it
with another possible approach.
A. Hierarchical Key Management
It can be easily seen that our proposed group key management scheme automatically supports a
hierarchical access control, which means that if a Sub can retrieve the encryption/decryption key32
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corresponding to a policy conﬁguration Pc, then it can retrieve keys for all policy conﬁgurations
that are dominated by Pc, where the notion of dominance relation between policy conﬁgurations
is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6: (Dominance relation).
Let Pci and Pcj be two policy conﬁgurations that apply to a document D. We say that Pci
dominates Pcj if and only and if Pci ⊆ Pcj.
Indeed, when the Sub satisﬁes an access control policy acp ∈ Pci and Pci dominates Pcj, then
automatically acp ∈ Pcj. Therefore the Sub can use the same set of CSSs that are used to derive
the decryption key for Pci to construction that for Pcj. Our approach can be further optimized
by eliminating reduntant calculations at Pub by taking advantage of dominance relationships.
B. Advantages over a Simplistic Approach
A simplistic approach to privacy-preserving policy-based content distribution is to obliviously
deliver (via the OCBE protocols) the encryption keys to a Sub for all broadcast contents.
However, this approach requires quite a large amount of communications between the Pub
and the Subs, and an individual Sub may need to maintain a high number of keys, one per
policy conﬁguration the Sub satisﬁes. Moreover, when any encryption key is changed, e.g., when
a new Sub joins or a subscription revocation takes place, the Pub has to communicate directly33
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with all Subs in order to update them with the new keys. This approach thus results in high
costs for the Pub, and is inconvenient for both the Pub and the Subs.
In contrast, our approach only requires the Pub to directly communicate with Subs during the
identity token registration phase to deliver the CSSs. Subs only need to maintain a list of CSSs.
All the CSSs are stable, in that they do not change after registration, unless an update of identity
attribute happens and the Sub registers its new identity token. When a rekey process takes place,
involved Subs just need to perform local computations to derive the new keys based on updated
information published by Pub and their old CSSs, without establishing direct communications
with Pub. Furthermore, in our scheme, the number of CSSs a Sub needs to manage is always
bounded by the total number N of attribute conditions involved in the access control policies,
whereas the simplistic approach requires a Sub to manage one key for each policy conﬁguration,
and the total number of policy conﬁgurations can be 22N in the worst case. Our approach is
efﬁcient in terms of communication and computation, and is easy to use and maintain for the
Pub and the Subs.
C. Scalability
The experimental results in Section VII have shown that the proposed key management scheme
works efﬁciently even when there are thousands of subscribers for a subdocument. However, as34
the upper bound N of the number of involved subscribers gets large, solving the linear system
AY = 0 over a large ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq becomes the most computationally expensive operation in
our proposed key management scheme. Solving this linear system with the method of Gaussian-
Jordan elimination [27] takes O(N3) time. Although this computation is executed at the Pub,
which is usually capable of carrying on computationally expensive operations, when N is very
large, e.g., N = 1,000,000, the resulting costs may be too high for the Pub. In this case, the
Pub can divide all the involved Subs into multiple groups of a suitable size (e.g., 1000 each),
compute a different ACV Y for each group, and broadcast it to the corresponding group, while
the subdocument is still encrypted with one uniform key. In practice, the grouping criterion can be
based on access control policies, subscribers’ physical locations, and so forth. The computation
of the ACV for each group is independent, thus can be performed in parallel.
Note also that a different and interesting group key management was suggested by one of the
anonymous referees when this paper was being peer-reviewed. We discuss and compare it with
our scheme below.
D. A New Group Key Management Scheme
The new method of group key management proposed by one of the reviewers is the following
one.
Pub ﬁrst chooses a “well-known marker” m that is long enough to avoid collision. Pub then
chooses a symmetric encryption key k for a (sub)document D associated with access control
policies acp1,...,acpα. Let H be a random oracle. Pub chooses a (long enough) random value35
z, and then publishes encrypted D together with z and N values
(k||m) ⊕ H(r
(1)
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(1)
1,2||...||r
(1)
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where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or operation.
To decrypt the message, a Sub ﬁnds which access control policy is satisﬁes for the document,
and then computes the key k using H and z, as follows. If CSSs r1,..,rw satisfy an access control
policy, then the Sub computes H(r1||...|rw||z). It then tries to decrypt all above N values by
XORing with H(r1||...|rw||z)). If any of the values contains the well-known marker m, then it
removes m from the decrypted text to obtain k.
This solution will require O(N) computation at Pub, O(N) ciphertext size, and O(N) com-
putation at Sub.
The new approach reduces the load at the Pub and does seem to satisfy our security require-
ments assuming the random oracle model. However, for an instantiation (with cryptographic
hash functions), one restriction of this approach is that the length of the key must be strictly
less than that of the hash output, whereas the scheme proposed in our paper allows the key size
(in bits) to be as large as twice of that of the hash output. Although a technique with ”multiple
markers” can be used to split a long key into shorter segments, this will also increase the load
on Subs. The choice of practical parameters (e.g. key size, hash output size, length of m) for
this new approach also seems to be a subtle issue. In the case of our scheme this is relatively
easy, and a security analysis is clearly provided.
Another advantage of our scheme over the new approach can be seen in the following36
demonstrative case. Suppose two different documents/subdocuments satisfying the same policy
conﬁguration are to be encrypted with different keys k1 and k2 (e.g., data are preprocessed then
assigned policies afterwards, and broadcast on a daily basis). Since the two documents share the
same policy conﬁguration, thus also the same user base, it is reasonable that in deployment they
share the same zi values. For our scheme in this case, for both documents, the Pub can simply
compute one matrix and its null space (once for both documents), then choose two linearly
independent ACVs and associate with them two different keys to compose the public vectors to
broadcast. From the Sub’s point of view, once a Sub receives all zi’s (say, for the day), the Sub
can compute the hash values and cache the resultant vector for future use to retrieve documents
associated with the same policy. Suppose an outside attacker knows one of the keys, say k1. Then
this knowledge alone does not help the attacker to learn any information about k2. However, for
the newly proposed scheme in this case, if the same z value is assigned to the two documents
associated with the same policy conﬁguration, for k1, the public values will be something like
X1 = (k1||m) ⊕ H(r||z), and for k2, the values will be like X2 = (k2||m) ⊕ H(r||z). Although
a valid Sub can still use the cached hash value H(r||z) to retrieve both keys k1 and k2, an
attacker who knows k1 can immediately obtain k2 by computing (X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ (k1||0-padding))
and extracting the ﬁrst bits. In this sense, our scheme is more ﬂexible and more secure to allow
ﬁne-grained control of encrypted data.
More importantly, our scheme is provably secure (see [28]), whereas the formal security proof
of the newly proposed scheme is not yet available. However, provided that the security of the
new scheme is formally deﬁned and analyzed, it might as well be suitable for adoption in a
variety of applications, including the one under this paper’s consideration.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed an approach to support attribute-based access control while preserving
privacy of users’ identity attributes in a document broadcasting setting. Our approach is supported
by a new group key management scheme which is secure and allows qualiﬁed subscribers to
efﬁciently extract decryption keys for the portions of documents they are allowed to access, based
on the subscription information they have received from the document publisher. The scheme
efﬁciently handles joining and leaving of subscribers, with guaranteed security. Experimental
results show that subscribers efﬁciently derive decryption keys, and that a rekey process at37
the publisher takes less than one minute for up to a thousand subscribers even on a personal
computer.
Our further research will focus on scalability and optimization issues. We will develop proper
criteria for clustering subscribers depending on different requirements of broadcasting. We have
also devised optimization strategies to reduced the size of the matrix A based on a partial order
among the set of access control policies.16 In our current implementation we use the kernel()
function of V. Shoup’s NTL library as the linear solver, and perform computations on the CPU.
We plan to further improve the performance of our scheme by extending the techniques [29],
[30], [31] which implement fast linear algebra operations with ﬂoating-point arithmetic or over
ﬁnite ﬁelds of various sizes, based on cache-aware CPU approaches and GPU architectures like
Nvidia CUDA [32].
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